# Appendix for "When Organizations Rebel: Introducing the Foundations of Rebel Group Emergence (FORGE) Dataset"

This document contains a variety of additional figures and tables to accompany the main manuscript. The following bar graphs offer more detail about the regional and temporal breakdowns of the types of organizations that gave rise to UCDP rebel groups around the world active between 1946 and 2011.

## Additional Distributions Over Time and Space




FIGURE A1: proportion of all rebel group parent organization types, by region





FIGURE A2: count of all rebel group parent organization types, by decade

FIGURE A3: proportion of all rebel group parent organization types, by decade



#### Disaggregating Rebel Strength Variables

The results in Table A1 are a reconsideration of the models from Table 1 of the manuscript, disaggregating the relative strength variables into component parts. The two variables capturing rebel groups with no parent organizations (including and excluding ethnic/refugee communities: *No Parent – Broad* and *No Parent – Narrow*, respectively) remain statistically significant at conventional levels and their substantive effect is similar as well.

Table A2 presents models with the same disaggregation of the rebel relative strength measures. Again, we see some fairly stark differences between the effects of of rebel group characteristics on conflict duration among groups with nonviolent origins versus those without their roots in political parties and civil society groups. There are only 14 observations in the full sample coded as having "high arms procurement capacity" and only 2 of the 14 have nonviolent roots (the Yemenite Socialist Party – Abdul Fattah Ismail faction and the Forces of Alfredo Stroessner military faction, which combined with the *Partido Colorado* political party to challenge the government in Paraguay), likely motivating the large coefficient for that variable in the context of Model 9, suggesting very short conflicts for rebel groups with nonviolent origins *and* high arms procurement capacity.

However, we also observe that the rebel group progeny of nonviolent organizations experience shorter conflicts when they have high mobilization capacity, a relationship that does not appear to hold for groups that lack these nonviolent organizational foundations in parties and civil society groups. Also, the substantive and statistical significance of having a legal political wing that can engage in nonviolent efforts to bring about a resolution to the incompatibility causing the conflict seems to matter only for rebel groups with nonviolent origins.

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|   | Model 6  | Model 7  |
|---|----------|----------|
| No Parent – Narrow                      | 0.657*   |          |
|   | (0.329)  |          |
| No Parent – Broad                       |          | 0.609**  |
|   |          | (0.211)  |
| Territorial control                     | -0.437*  | -0.458*  |
|   | (0.184)  | (0.183)  |
| Strong central command                  | 0.174    | 0.206    |
| _                                       | (0.214)  | (0.213)  |
| High mobilization capacity              | 0.459+   | 0.476+   |
|   | (0.276)  | (0.285)  |
| High arms procurement cap.              | 2.426**  | 2.413**  |
|   | (0.722)  | (0.733)  |
| High fighting capacity                  | 0.304    | 0.310    |
|   | (0.490)  | (0.491)  |
| Legal political wing                    | 0.499*   | 0.527*   |
|   | (0.233)  | (0.231)  |
| War on core territory                   | -0.278   | -0.316   |
| , i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i | (0.403)  | (0.391)  |
| Coup d'etat                             | 3.340**  | 3.372**  |
| -                                       | (0.292)  | (0.292)  |
| ELF index                               | 0.651+   | 0.720*   |
|   | (0.372)  | (0.367)  |
| Ethnic conflict                         | 0.206    | 0.178    |
|   | (0.160)  | (0.158)  |
| ln(GDP per capita)                      | 0.188+   | 0.207+   |
|   | (0.109)  | (0.107)  |
| Democracy                               | -1.241** | -1.245** |
|   | (0.247)  | (0.245)  |
| Two or more dyads                       | -0.372*  | -0.378*  |
| -                                       | (0.154)  | (0.152)  |
| ln(Population)                          | -0.124+  | -0.128*  |
| · - /                                   | (0.066)  | (0.065)  |

 TABLE A1: "Parentless" Rebels and Civil Conflict Duration (disaggregated rebel relative strength variables)

NOTE: N=2,000. Robust standard errors clustered by conflict in parentheses \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1

|                            | Model 8       | Model 9     | Model 10       |
|----------------------------|---------------|-------------|----------------|
|                            | (Full Sample) | (NV Parent) | (No NV Parent) |
| Territorial control        | -0.439*       | -0.422+     | -0.443+        |
|                            | (0.184)       | (0.254)     | (0.260)        |
| Strong central command     | 0.181         | 0.312       | 0.104          |
|                            | (0.218)       | (0.394)     | (0.293)        |
| High mobilization capacity | 0.445         | 0.825*      | -0.142         |
|                            | (0.280)       | (0.378)     | (0.486)        |
| High arms procurement cap. | 2.394**       | 33.292**    | 2.240**        |
|                            | (0.721)       | (0.685)     | (0.656)        |
| High fighting capacity     | 0.270         | -0.057      | 0.937          |
|                            | (0.484)       | (0.607)     | (0.609)        |
| Legal political wing       | 0.505*        | 0.687*      | 0.370          |
|                            | (0.239)       | (0.283)     | (0.472)        |
| War on core territory      | -0.267        | -0.239      | -1.075+        |
|                            | (0.397)       | (0.408)     | (0.550)        |
| Coup d'etat                | 3.325**       | 39.775**    | 3.272**        |
|                            | (0.292)       | (0.887)     | (0.325)        |
| ELF index                  | 0.687 +       | 1.098       | 0.045          |
|                            | (0.372)       | (0.683)     | (0.459)        |
| Ethnic conflict            | 0.194         | 0.247       | 0.071          |
|                            | (0.163)       | (0.236)     | (0.228)        |
| ln(GDP per capita)         | 0.190+        | 0.248       | 0.075          |
|                            | (0.110)       | (0.152)     | (0.184)        |
| Democracy                  | -1.251**      | -1.067**    | -1.504**       |
|                            | (0.246)       | (0.278)     | (0.415)        |
| Two or more dyads          | -0.384*       | -0.670**    | -0.189         |
|                            | (0.155)       | (0.239)     | (0.182)        |
| ln(Population)             | -0.138*       | -0.040      | -0.121         |
| ,                          | (0.064)       | (0.097)     | (0.098)        |
| Observations               | 2,000         | 995         | 1,005          |

 TABLE A2: Rebel Group Traits and Conflict Duration, Split by Nonviolent Origins, (disaggregated rebel relative strength variables)

NOTE: Robust standard errors clustered by conflict in parentheses \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1

#### Exploring Nonviolent Origins and Conflict Duration

| An important contribution of the FORGE dataset is to highlight the role that groups                  |
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| engaging in conventional political and/or social activities – namely, political parties and civil    |
| society organizations like student groups, trade unions, and formalized religious communities        |
| - can play in fomenting rebellion. The following is a list of the rebel groups (name and             |
| acronym as provided by UCDP) that had at least one "nonviolent" parent organization:                 |
| Jabha-yi Nijat-i Milli-yi Afghanistan, Afghanistan<br>Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Afghanistan |
| Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Afghanistan   |
| People's Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (PDPA), Afghanistan                                      |
| Armed Islamic Group (GIA), Algeria   |
| Armed Islamic Movement (AIS), Algeria  |
| Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda-Renewed (FLEC-R), Angola                          |
|  |

Union of Angolan Peoples (FNLA), Angola Montoneros, Argentina People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), Argentina Popular Revolutionary Movement, Bolivia National Revolutionary Movement (MNR), Bolivia Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bosnia and Herzegovina National Council for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD), Burundi Khmer Rouge, Cambodia Union of the Populations of Cameroon (UPC), Cameroon National Liberation Front of Chad (FROLINAT), Chad Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT), Chad Union of Forces for the Resistance (UFR), Chad People's Liberation Army (PLA), China 19 April Movement (M-19), Colombia National Liberation Army (ELN), Colombia People's Liberation Army (EPL), Colombia Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Colombia Cobras, Republic of Congo Cocoyes, Republic of Congo Ninjas, Republic of Congo National Liberation Army (ELN), Costa Rica Cuban Revolution Movement/Fidelistas (M-26-7), Cuba Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Kinshasa (AFDL), DRC Independent Mining State of South Kasai, DRC Kingdom of Kongo, DRC National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), DRC National Liberation Council (CNL), DRC State of Katanga, DRC Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD), Djibouti

Military faction (Constitutionalists), Dominican Republic al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, Egypt Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation (FMLN), El Salvador Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), El Salvador People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), El Salvador Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP), Ethiopia Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Ethiopia Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF), Ethiopia National Revolutionary Council (NRC), Gambia National Guard and Mkhedrioni (Anti-Government Alliance), Georgia Zviadists, Georgia Military faction of Francisco Arana (Aranistas), Guatemala Rebel Armed Forces (FAR I), Guatemala Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR II), Guatemala Communist Party of India (CPI), India Communist Party of India - Marxist/Leninist (CPI-ML), India Maoist Communist Centre (MCC), India Mizo National Front (MNF), India Naga Nationalist Council (NNC), India Tripura National Volunteers (TNV), India United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), India Darul Islam, Indonesia Permesta Movement, Indonesia Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin), Indonesia Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic (PRRI), Indonesia Arab Political and Cultural Organization (APCO), Iran People's Mujahideen (MEK), Iran Republic of Kurdistan (KDPI), Iran Islamic Army of Iraq (RJF), Iraq Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), Iraq Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Iraq Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), Iraq al-Mahdi Army, Iraq al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade (AMB), Israel Hamas, Israel Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Israel Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Israel Lebanese Forces, Lebanon Lebanese National Movement (NSF), Lebanon Lebanese Resistance Detachment (Amal), Lebanon National Union Front (NUF), Lebanon National Movement for the Independence of Madagascar (Monima), Madagascar Clandestine Communist Organization (CCO), Malaysia Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), Malaysia Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MPA), Mali Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO), Morocco & Mauritania All-Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF), Myanmar

Arakan People's Liberation Party (APLP), Myanmar Communist Party of Burma (CPB), Myanmar Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), Myanmar Karen National Union (KNU), Myanmar Mon Freedom League-Mon United Front (MFL-MUF), Myanmar Mon People's Solidarity Group (MPF), Myanmar Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M), Nepal Nepali Congress, Nepal Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), Nicaragua Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Nigeria Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (Boko Haram), Nigeria Republic of Biafra, Nigeria Baloch Liberation Front (BLF), Pakistan Baloch Ittehad, Pakistan Balochistan Republican Army (BRA), Pakistan Mukti Bahini, Pakistan Mohajir National Movement (MQM), Pakistan Military faction (forces of Alfredo Stroessner), Paraguay Military faction (forces of Andres Rodriguez), Paraguay Opposition coalition (Febreristas, Liberals and Communists), Paraguay Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), Peru National Liberation Army (ELN), Peru Sendero Luminoso, Peru Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), Peru Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), Philippines People's Liberation Army (Huk), Philippines National Salvation Front (NSF), Romania Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF), Russia/USSR Parliamentary Forces, Russia Republic of Armenia (Armenian National Movement), Russia/USSR Ukraine Partisan Army (UPA), Russia/USSR Wahhabi movement of the Buinaksk district (Republic of Dagestan), Russia Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR), Rwanda Movement of the Democratic Forces of the Casamance (MFDC), Senegal Somali National Movement (SNM), Somalia Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), Somalia Supreme Islamic Council of Somalia (ARS/UIC), Somalia African National Congress (ANC), South Africa South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), South Africa Yemenite Socialist Party - Abdul Fattah Ismail faction, South Yemen Euskadi Ta Askatsuna (ETA), Spain People's Liberation Front (JVP), Sri Lanka Anya Nya, Sudan Islamic Charter Front, Sudan Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), Sudan National Democratic Alliance (NDA), Sudan South Sudan Defence Movement/Army (SSDM/A), Sudan Sudanese Communist Party, Sudan

Muslim Brotherhood, Syria United Tajik Opposition (UTO), Tajikistan Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), Thailand Jamaat al-Muslimeen, Trinidad and Tobago Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), Turkey Puerto Rican Nationalist Party, United States Popular Resistance Army (NRA), Uganda Movement of National Liberation/Tupamaros (MLN/Tupamaros), Uruguay Democratic Republic of Yemen, Yemen National Democratic Front (NDF), Yemen Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), Zimbabwe/Rhodesia

We also provide the following crosstabs to allow readers to more readily examine

how dyad-year observations involving rebel groups with and without nonviolent parent

organizations vary in terms of key variables from the CGS 2009 study: legal political wings,

strength relative to the government, and territorial control.

| TADLE AJ. INUIVIUICII | i oligilis allu lebel lei | auve suengin      |       |
|-----------------------|---------------------------|-------------------|-------|
|                       | Nonviolent Parent         | Nonviolent Parent |       |
|                       | Organization: NO          | Organization: YES | TOTAL |
| Much stronger         | 11                        | 1                 | 12    |
| Stronger              | 25                        | 18                | 43    |
| Parity                | 108                       | 35                | 143   |
| Weaker                | 599                       | 483               | 1,082 |
| Much weaker           | 673                       | 468               | 1,141 |
| Doesn't apply/unclear | 6                         | 0                 | 6     |
| TOTAL                 | 1,422                     | 1,005             | 2,427 |

TABLE A3: Nonviolent origins and rebel relative strength

## TABLE A4: Nonviolent origins and legal political wings

|                   | Nonviolent Parent | Nonviolent Parent |       |
|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------|
|                   | Organization: NO  | Organization: YES | TOTAL |
| Legal wing        | 103               | 169               | 272   |
| No legal wing     | 288               | 423               | 711   |
| Unclear           | 9                 | 45                | 54    |
| No political wing | 1,022             | 368               | 1,390 |
| TOTAL             | 1,422             | 1,005             | 2,427 |

## TABLE A5: Nonviolent origins and territorial control

|                        | Nonviolent Parent | Nonviolent Parent |       |
|------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------|
|                        | Organization: NO  | Organization: YES | TOTAL |
| Territorial control    | 420               | 496               | 916   |
| No Territorial control | 1,000             | 484               | 1,484 |
| Unclear                | 2                 | 25                | 27    |
| TOTAL                  | 1,422             | 1,005             | 2,427 |

Table A6 explores whether having nonviolent origins on their own – included as an independent variable, rather than the condition along which we split the sample of rebel groups – has an impact on the duration of civil war. We see that the association between duration and this indicator of nonviolent parent organizations (parties and/or CSOs) is not statistically significant on its own. Thus, the effect of nonviolent origins works through other organizational features, such as legal political wings and relative strength, as can be seen in Table 2 of the manuscript.

|                       | Model 11      |
|-----------------------|---------------|
|                       | (Full sample) |
| Nonviolent Parent     | -0.147        |
|                       | (0.181)       |
| Territorial control   | -0.506**      |
|                       | (0.191)       |
| Rebels stronger       | 1.193**       |
|                       | (0.399)       |
| Rebels at parity      | 0.483*        |
|                       | (0.233)       |
| Legal political wing  | 0.581*        |
|                       | (0.249)       |
| War on core territory | -0.267        |
|                       | (0.393)       |
| Coup d'etat           | 3.281**       |
|                       | (0.302)       |
| ELF index             | 0.620         |
|                       | (0.398)       |
| Ethnic conflict       | 0.166         |
|                       | (0.170)       |
| ln(GDP per capita)    | 0.230*        |
|                       | (0.110)       |
| Democracy             | -1.298**      |
|                       | (0.257)       |
| Two or more dyads     | -0.397**      |
|                       | (0.149)       |
| ln(Population)        | -0.102        |
| ,                     | (0.068)       |
| Observations          | 2,000         |

**TABLE A6:** Rebel Group Traits and Conflict Duration, Incl. Nonviolent Origins

NOTE: Robust standard errors clustered by conflict in parentheses \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1

## Parent Organization variables included in FORGE:

#### preorg

Did the rebel group derive its initial membership from at least one identifiable, named preexisting organization? If so, what type(s)?

- 0 = no pre-existing organization, group began as the rebel organization of observation
- 1 = group evolved/splintered from a pre-existing rebel group included in UCDP
- 2 = group evolved/splintered from a pre-existing armed non-state group that did not cause 25 or more battle deaths (e.g. terrorist organization, private militia)
- 3 = group developed from a political party
- 4 = group developed from a non-party political movement
- 5 = group developed from a student/youth group
- 6 = group developed from a labor/trade union
- 7 = group splintered/emerged from the government's armed forces
- 8 = group emerged from a non-military faction within the government
- 9 = group emerged from the country's former armed forces
- 10 = group developed from a religious organization
- 11 = group developed from foreign fighters/mercenaries
- 12 = group emerged from a refugee/exiled community (but not a formal organization)
- 13 = group emerged from an ethnic group (but not a formal organization)
- 14 = group emerged from a non-military faction within a former regime's government

#### preorgno

Indicator (0=no, 1=yes): did the rebel group not evolve out of a pre-existing organization – instead beginning its existence as an armed organization causing at least 25 battle deaths in conflict with the government?

#### preorgreb

Indicator (0=no, 1=yes): did the rebel group splinter from an existing rebel group that already caused at least 25 battle deaths in conflict with the government (and thus is included in the UCDP/NSA databases)?

#### preorgter

Indicator (0=no, 1=yes): did the rebel group splinter from an existing armed non-state group that did not yet cause 25 or more battle deaths (and thus is not included in the UCDP/NSA databases)?

#### preorgpar

Indicator (0=no, 1=yes): did the rebel group develop from a political party? These are organizations that express a desire to contest elections and/or hold political office. They may or may not have participated in elections and/or held office previously, but have organized for this purpose (as compared to groups with political agendas but no explicit goal/organization to run candidates for office and challenge the government that way).

## preorgmvt

Indicator (0=no, 1=yes): did the rebel group develop from an informal political movement? These are organizations that have expressed primarily political demands and may pursue them in a variety of ways, but they have NOT organized as parties with the intention to contest elections and/or field candidates for political office.

#### preorgyou

Indicator (0=no, 1=yes): did the rebel group develop from a student/youth group?

# preorglab

Indicator (0=no, 1=yes): did the rebel group develop from labor/trade union?

# preorgrel

Indicator (0=no, 1=yes): did the rebel group develop from a religious organization (movement or institution)?

## preorgmil

Indicator (0=no, 1=yes): did the rebel group develop from the government's current armed forces?

# preorgfmr

Indicator (0=no, 1=yes): did the rebel group develop from a former government's armed forces that were disbanded for some reason, often after leadership transitions?

## preorggov

Indicator (0=no, 1=yes): did the rebel group develop from a non-military faction of the current government? This might include members of the cabinet, the ruling party, or a regional government that is/had been organized and operating with approval from the central government.

## preorgfor

Indicator (0=no, 1=yes): did the rebel group develop from a group of foreign fighters/mercenaries/troops of another government's armed forces?

# preorgref

Indicator (0=no, 1=yes): did the rebel group develop from an identifiable refugee community or other exiled population?

# preorgeth

Indicator (0=no, 1=yes): did the rebel group develop from an identifiable ethnic group, but not from an identifiable (named) organization within that community?

## preorgoth

Indicator (0=no, 1=yes): did the rebel group develop from a non-military faction of a former regime's government? (e.g. regional governments that were not preserved after a regime change)