Determinants of Colombian attitudes toward the peace process: **Online Appendix**

Summary Statistics

Table A1 presents the summary statistics for all variables used in the analyses presented in the paper and in the models reported in this appendix.

Table A1: Summary statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
peace	4.352	2.201	1	7	1481
victim	0.413	0.493	0	1	1499
victimsum	0.898	1.334	0	7	1499
killed	0.285	0.451	0	1	1499
refugee	0.064	0.245	0	1	1499
displaced	0.234	0.424	0	1	1499
forced relocation	0.045	0.208	0	1	1499
raped	0.019	0.138	0	1	1499
tortured	0.051	0.221	0	1	1499
kidnapped	0.047	0.211	0	1	1499
occupied land	0.152	0.359	0	1	1499
proximity	2.367	1.588	1	7	1499
Centro Democratico	0.074	0.262	0	1	1499
National Unity	0.126	0.332	0	1	1499
democracy	5.279	1.64	1	7	1428
ideology	5.833	2.656	1	10	1262
disaffection	2.923	0.961	1	4	1498
age	37.96	15.463	18	88	1498
education	9.668	4.048	0	18	1497
Catholic	0.714	0.452	0	1	1499
female	0.498	0.5	0	1	1499
income	9.075	4.377	0	16	1395
rural	0.216	0.412	0	1	1499
black	0.069	0.253	0	1	1499
indigenous	0.048	0.214	0	1	1499

Table A2: Determinants of Support for the Colombian Peace Process (Ordered Logit)

	Model 5
victim	-0.057
	(0.110)
proximity	0.009
	(0.037)
Centro Democratico	-0.825***
	(0.212)
National Unity	0.555***
	(0.163)
democracy	0.141***
	(0.037)
ideology	-0.001
	(0.022)
age	-0.005
	(0.004)
education	-0.037*
	(0.016)
Catholic	-0.229
	(0.118)
female	0.035
	(0.106)
income	-0.008
	(0.014)
rural	0.297*
	(0.140)
black	0.129
	(0.210)
indigenous	-0.157
	(0.259)
N	1136

Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Individual categories of covariates

In order to assess the effects of conflict exposure, political preferences, and demographic traits independent of one another, we report here the results of a series of models that focus on each of these explanatory categories independent of the other two. Table A3 reports the findings of these various models. Results are generally quite similar to those presented above as part of the unified model in Table A2, which is used to produce Figure 1 in the paper.

Conflict exposure

In Model 2, we use the binary indicator of whether the respondent or someone in his or her household experienced one of the following at the hands of combatants in the civil war: death, torture, kidnapping, rape, forced relocation, internal displacement, refugee flight, and loss of land through occupation. Model 3 replaces that binary variable with a sum of the number of such experiences suffered in the household. Neither coefficient demonstrates statistical significance, so the effect of personal or familial suffering during the war on one's attitudes toward the peace process does not appear to be differentiable from zero.

The other principal element of our conflict exposure category of variables is an effort to capture an individual's general geographic proximity to the civil war, using a measure of conflict intensity and persistence in the respondent's municipality. The variable *proximity* is not statistically significant at conventional levels, nor does it relate to attitudes toward the peace process in the manner we expect across any of these three models. As the respondent's proximity to areas of fighting decreases, their level of support for negotiations with the FARC actually increases – though, again because the coefficient does not demonstrate statistical significance, we cannot confidently draw this conclusion because the effect of proximity to war zones may actually have no bearing (or even our anticipated negative impact) on a person's perception of the peace process. Upon initial examination, we do not find support for our conflict exposure hypothesis.

Individual forms of direct conflict exposure

In Table A4 we also report results of our unified model (reported in the paper Table 1) using each of the forms of civilian victimization used to construct the *victim* and *victimsum* variables: death, torture, kidnapping, rape, forced relocation, internal displacement, refugee flight, and loss of land through occupation by combatants. None of these forms of abuse demonstrate a statistically significant effect on one's support for the peace process on their own, or when combined with the others in our aforementioned indicator and count variables.

Political preferences

Model 4 is based on our second set of variables, those pertaining to an individual's political preferences. We see results largely in line with our expectations regarding the effect that party affiliation and opinion of democracy have on one's support for a negotiated end to the Colombian civil war. Those who identify with the *Centro Democrático* party, organized in large part to promote a military solution to the war, are significantly less likely to support

the peace process, whereas those identifying as being sympathetic with the National Unity governing coalition are much more likely to have a favorable opinion of the negotiations. This supports our second hypothesis. In line with our third hypothesis, Colombians who view democracy more favorably are also more likely to favor negotiations, while identification along a left-right ideological spectrum does not seem to dictate systematically one's views of the Havana talks (thereby not supporting our fourth hypothesis).

Demographic traits

Model 5 considers factors related to an individual's demographic traits that are included as control variables in our comprehensive model. This set of covariates does not demonstrate many discernible or meaningful relationships between one's socioeconomic background or other identifying characteristics and his or her support for negotiations with the FARC. Age, religion, gender, household income, and ethnicity do not demonstrate effects on opinions of the peace process that are differentiable from zero. The coefficient for the respondent's level of education is not statistically significant at conventional levels but is close, suggesting that more years in school might lead to a lower tolerance for the talks with the FARC. The only demographic variable that is statistically significant in this model is the indicator of whether the respondent lived in a rural area; urban Colombians appear to be less supportive of the peace talks than their rural counterparts.

Table A3: Categories of Determinants of Support for the Colombian Peace Process

	Model 2 Conflict Exposure	Model 3 Conflict Exposure	Model 4 Political Preferences	Model 5 Demographic Traits
victim	0.018			
	(0.108)			
victimsum		-0.014		
		(0.041)		
proximity	0.056	0.057		
	(0.034)	(0.034)		
Centro Democratico			-0.835***	
			(0.207)	
National Unity			0.536**	
			(0.160)	
democracy			0.126***	
			(0.036)	
ideology			0.009	
			(0.021)	
age				-0.001
				(0.004)
education				-0.030
				(0.016)
Catholic				-0.187
				(0.118)
female				0.030
				(0.106)
income				-0.010
				(0.013)
rural				0.316*
				(0.134)
black				0.179
				(0.207)
indigenous				-0.152
				(0.256)

N=1136. Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A4: Victimization as Determinants of Support for the Colombian Peace Process

	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13
killed	-0.020							
	(0.119)							
refugee		-0.181						
		(0.234)						
displaced			-0.118					
			(0.132)					
forced relocation				-0.068				
				(0.292)				
raped					-0.061			
					(0.413)			
tortured						-0.221		
						(0.263)		
kidnapped							0.292	
							(0.279)	
occupied land								-0.200
								(0.154)
proximity	0.009	0.008	0.010	0.010	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.011
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Centro Democratico	-0.828***	-0.831***	-0.816***	-0.828***	-0.831***	-0.826***	-0.837***	-0.817***
	(0.212)	(0.212)	(0.211)	(0.212)	(0.211)	(0.211)	(0.213)	(0.212)
National Unity	0.551***	0.553***	0.556***	0.549***	0.551***	0.560***	0.533**	0.551***
	(0.164)	(0.163)	(0.163)	(0.163)	(0.163)	(0.164)	(0.164)	(0.163)
democracy	0.140***	0.140***	0.142***	0.140***	0.140***	0.138***	0.139***	0.142***
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
ideology	-0.001	0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
age	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.004	-0.005	-0.005
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
education	-0.036*	-0.035*	-0.037*	-0.036*	-0.036*	-0.036*	-0.037*	-0.036*
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Catholic	-0.225	-0.227	-0.230	-0.226	-0.224	-0.229	-0.218	-0.238*
	(0.118)	(0.118)	(0.118)	(0.118)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.118)	(0.119)
female	0.035	0.038	0.037	0.035	0.036	0.032	0.037	0.039
	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.106)	(0.106)
income	-0.007	-0.007	-0.008	-0.007	-0.007	-0.008	-0.008	-0.008
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
rural	0.298*	0.297*	0.298*	0.297*	0.297*	0.301*	0.301*	0.299*
	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.140)
black	0.126	0.139	0.139	0.128	0.126	0.131	0.118	0.151
	(0.210)	(0.213)	(0.213)	(0.212)	(0.212)	(0.211)	(0.211)	(0.211)
indigenous	-0.156	-0.161	-0.150	-0.153	-0.152	-0.151	-0.162	-0.151
	(0.260)	(0.259)	(0.259)	(0.259)	(0.259)	(0.259)	(0.260)	(0.259)

N=1136. Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Additional specifications of unified model

We consider whether a sense of general political disaffection mattered for one's support of the peace process, given the importance of other political preferences and opinions. We measure political disaffection using the results from the LAPOP survey question POL1, essentially asking respondents "How much interest do you have in politics?" They could select one of four responses: a lot (which we coded 1), some (coded 2), little (coded 3), and not at all (coded 4). We use these values to construct the variable *disaffection*, which is included in Model 15. Here, we see that higher levels of disaffection – those respondents who care little or not at all about Colombian politics – are less supportive of the peace process, but this association is not statistically significant so we cannot be sure that this is the true relationship.

Also, it is possible that an interactive effect between one's income level and rural residency was an important determinant of support for the peace talks between the government and the FARC. Wealth rural landowners have long opposed land reform that would require them to relinquish some of their territory to be redistributed to others; this redistribution was an important part of the land reform aspect of the Havana talks and thus we might expect that this segment of the population will be less supportive of talks as compared to poor rural residents and city dwellers. To address this possibility, in Model 16 we include an interaction term *incomeXrural*. The coefficient for the interaction term, as well as the linear combinations of *incomeXrural+income* and *incomeXrural+rural* are not statistically significant. This suggests that, in 2014, wealthy Colombians living in rural areas were no more or less supportive of peace talks than their counterparts.

Table A5: Alternative Specifications of Determinants of Support for the Peace Process

	Model 14	Model 15
victim	-0.066	-0.061
	(0.110)	(0.110)
proximity	0.007	0.009
	(0.037)	(0.037)
Centro Democratico	-0.882***	-0.831***
	(0.216)	(0.213)
National Unity	0.493**	0.557***
	(0.167)	(0.163)
democracy	0.137***	0.141***
	(0.037)	(0.037)
ideology	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.022)	(0.022)
disaffection	-0.105	
	(0.060)	
age	-0.005	-0.004
	(0.004)	(0.004)
education	-0.043*	-0.036*
	(0.017)	(0.016)
Catholic	-0.218	-0.232
	(0.118)	(0.119)
female	0.056	0.034
	(0.106)	(0.106)
income	-0.007	-0.012
	(0.014)	(0.016)
rural	0.305*	0.169
	(0.140)	(0.250)
incomeXrural		0.018
		(0.030)
black	0.143	0.131
	(0.209)	(0.211)
indigenous	-0.149	-0.154
	(0.256)	(0.260)

N=1136. Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Determinants of support for *Centro Democrático*

In order to help assuage concerns that endogeneity exists between one's degree of skepticism of the Havana talks and their political party affiliation (namely with the *Centro Democrático*), we specify a model in which we use the determinants of support for the peace process to predict identification as a supporter of the CD. *National Unity* is not included as it is mutually exclusive relative to *Centro Democratico* – a respondent cannot identify with both parties. The results are presented in Model 17, and they do not highlight particular concerns that support for CD is particularly determined by the same factors as support for the negotiations. Catholics and women are less likely to support the *Centro Democrático*, but determinants of opinion regarding the peace process such as one's affinity for democracy and rural status do not appear to be correlated with this party identification.

Table A6: Determinants of Support for the *Centro Democrático*

	Model 16
victim	0.301
	(0.213)
proximity	0.019
	(0.082)
democracy	0.120
	(0.075)
ideology	0.046
	(0.040)
age	-0.006
	(0.009)
education	0.033
	(0.031)
Catholic	-0.595**
	(0.221)
female	-0.538*
	(0.224)
income	0.061
	(0.032)
rural	0.378
	(0.310)
black	-0.592
	(0.526)
indigenous	-1.649
	(1.040)

N=1136. Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Unraveling effects of party vs. ideology

The effects of party identification are quite significant, while a general measure of left-right political ideology is robustly insignificant. This might lead one to wonder: are people just following their parties on this issue, or are parties doing a good job of sorting people by political preferences? The previous section examines determinants of support for the CD, but it is worth considering whether the potential relationship between political ideology and support for peace talks is being washed out by party identification. To examine this in more detail, we offer a series of bivariate regressions with each of our variables capturing "political preferences" as well as versions of Model 4 from Table A3 and Model 1 from Table A2 where the party variables are omitted. Across these models, the *ideology* variable continues to be statistically insignificant. Thus, it does not appear that general political ideology is driving both party affiliation and support for a negotiated settlement. The finding that left-right ideology is not a systematic predictor of support for the peace process holds here, even in the absence of indicators of party affiliation.

Table A7: A Closer Examination of Political Preferences and Support for Peace Talks

	Model 17	Model 18	Model 19	Model 20	Model 21	Model 22
Centro Democratico	-0.869***					
	(0.201)					
National Unity		0.633***				
		(0.155)				
democracy			0.125***		0.123***	0.139***
			(0.036)		(0.036)	(0.037)
ideology				0.020	0.013	0.002
				(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
victim						-0.052
						(0.109)
proximity						0.017
						(0.037)
age						-0.004
						(0.004)
education						-0.038*
						(0.016)
Catholic						-0.182
						(0.118)
female						0.040
						(0.106)
income						-0.012
						(0.014)
rural						0.254
						(0.139)
black						0.199
						(0.210)
indigenous						-0.165
						(0.258)

N=1136. Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$